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Criminal Violations of Environmental Laws:
Model Sentencing Guidelines §2E1

Model Sentencing Guidelines §2E1 Environmental
Crimes

(a) Base Offense Level: The base offense level for all
offenses covered by this guideline is 1.
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) Harmfulness: If the offense conduct resulted in
an unreasonable risk of:
(A) Any harm to the environment
add 1
(B) Aggravated harm to the environment add 2
(C) Catastrophic harm to the environment
or the imminent death or imminent
serious bodily injury of one person
add 3
(D) Imminent death or imminent serious
bodily injury of at least five people
add 4
(E) Imminent death or imminent serious
bodily injury of at least twenty-five
people
add 5
(2) Elevated Risk and Aggravated Mens Rea: If the
offense level was enhanced under Subsection
(b)(1) above, increase the offense level by an additional one level if the applicable harm (as
described in (b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), or (E)) was
practically certain to result from the offense conduct and the defendant knew that this harm was
practically certain to occur.
(3) Death: If the offense conduct resulted in the death
of at least one person, add one level.
(c) Advisory Factors to be considered in setting the sentencing within the applicable range
In determining the position of a sentence within
the applicable range, the court should consider
whether any of the following factors exist:
(1) Aggravating Factors:
(A) The offense conduct resulted in actual harm of
any type, as opposed to the mere risk of harm
(except that the actual harm of death is separately accounted for in Subsection (b)(3) above);
(B) The offense conduct created risks of harm
that, either in kind or degree, are not adequately accounted for in the determination of
the sentencing range;
(C) The offense conduct occurred on more than
one occasion;

(D) The offender has previously been subject to
an administrative sanction or civil judgment
in connection with an earlier environmental
violation;
(E) The offense constituted a violation of a judicial or administrative order;
(F) The offense constituted a violation of a permit or a knowing failure to obtain a permit;
(G) The offender took affirmative steps to conceal the offense or failed to comply with a
legal obligation to report the offense or environmental contamination resulting from the
offense;
(H) If an enhancement under Subsection (b)(1)
was applied based on an unreasonable risk of
harm, but there was no enhancement under
Subsection (b)(2), and the offender acted in
conscious disregard of the risk;
(I) The offender’s purpose was to cause harm to
human health or the environment.
(2) Mitigating Factors:
(A) The offender had a good-faith belief, based
on a mistake of law or fact, that the offense
conduct was not prohibited by law;
(B) The offender exceeded the minimal requirements of the law in reporting or responding
to the offense conduct so as to minimize any
risks of harm;
(C) No harm was actually caused, or any harm
was limited to the offender’s own property or
business.
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Application Notes:

DEFINITIONS: An “unreasonable risk” is a substantial and
unjustifiable risk. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the offender’s conduct giving rise to the risk constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the offender’s situation, taking into
account the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him.
A “harm to the environment” is any type of lasting, measurable degradation of air, water, or soil quality; death of a
legally protected wild plant or animal; exposure of any person
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to a regulated substance in such a quantity and in such circumstances as are likely to cause a bodily injury or to increase
significantly the person’s risk of contracting a fatal or disabling
medical condition in the future; or disruption of a public utility.
An “aggravated harm to the environment” is an environmental harm that substantially, adversely affects a sizeable
area of land or water, in terms of its ability to support plant or
animal life, or its ability to be used by humans for commercial
or recreational purposes. The smaller the area affected (e.g.,
just one acre of land), the more serious the degradation would
have to be in order to qualify. The term also includes the death
of a substantial number of plants or animals (taking into consideration the rarity, ecological significance, and legal status of
the species involved); exposure of at least five people to a regulated substance in such a quantity and in such circumstances
as are likely to cause bodily injury or to increase significantly
the risk of contracting a fatal or disabling medical condition in
the future; or a major, short-term disruption of human activities, such as the evacuation of a neighborhood.
A “catastrophic harm to the environment” is an aggravated
environmental harm that, based on its unusual duration;
intensity; geographical scope; number of people, plants, or animals affected; and/or ecological or economic costs, is of such an
extreme nature that it can fairly be termed a “catastrophe.”
The term includes the exposure of at least twenty-five people to
a regulated substance in such a quantity and in such circumstances as are likely to cause bodily injury or to increase
significantly the risk of contracting a fatal or disabling medical
condition in the future. The term also includes comparably
severe, long-term disruptions to ecosystems or human communities, such as the filling-in of hundreds of acres of wetlands, or
the contamination of a community’s water supply, such that
the community would have to obtain water from alternative
sources at considerably greater expense for an indefinite period
of time.
DRAFTER’S COMMENTARY
I. General Approach

This Model Guideline covers the offenses now governed
by U.S.S.G. §§2Q1.1, 2Q1.2, and 2Q1.3. It is premised on
the view that, in sentencing an environmental offender,
three considerations should predominate: (1) harm (the
magnitude of injury that was threatened by the offender’s
conduct), (2) danger (the likelihood that the harm would
actually come about), and (3) mens rea (the offender’s
state of mind with respect to the harm).1 In general, this
view is philosophically consistent with the existing guidelines, particularly in its emphasis on harm and danger.
(The existing guidelines give comparatively less attention
to mens rea but do not wholly disregard that factor,
either.)
Environmental crime differs from most other sorts of
crime in the extraordinary range of potential harm, both in
terms of kind and degree. For instance, theft and fraud
crimes will all involve the harm of property loss. Environ-
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mental crimes also sometimes involve property loss, as
when a victim’s property loses market value due to
groundwater contamination. In other cases, however, the
harm will be to wildlife, air, or bodies of water that are not
any person’s property but rather public goods. The available means of translating these sorts of harms into
pecuniary terms, as is common for purposes of sentencing most property crimes, are both unusually complex and
not wholly satisfactory from a theoretical standpoint. In
still other cases, the principal harm will be to human
health. Health-related harms cover a vast range, from the
immediate and dramatic (e.g., severe burns over much of
a victim’s body), to the immediate and minor (e.g., a temporary rash over a small portion of a victim’s body), to the
possibility of long-term consequences that may or may not
ever materialize (e.g., the possibility of contracting lung
disease as a result of asbestos exposure). Finally, some
cases present, at most, so-called regulatory harms—for
example, the inconvenience and expense that may be
imposed on regulatory agencies as a result of record-keeping violations. The unusual range of harms encompassed
by environmental cases presents important challenges in
drafting an environmental sentencing guideline.
In order to deal with these challenges, the existing
guidelines employ a seemingly ad hoc array of specific,
overlapping indicia of harm and danger, with considerable
risk of both over- and undercounting the true severity of
the offense.2 The proposed guideline instead employs a
small number of broadly defined, flexible categories. This
approach is better suited both to the diverse nature of
environmental crimes and to the need to minimize the
number of decision points for the jury.
Some may be uncomfortable with the use of imprecise,
qualitative language to define the categories. (For
instance, the boundaries of what constitutes a “catastrophe” are not objectively ascertainable in any precise way.)
This will undoubtedly entail some uniformity costs, as different juries apply the language in different ways. On the
other hand, it is easy to overestimate the uniformity benefits of seemingly more objective specific offense
characteristics (“SOCs”), which, for instance, are readily
manipulable through the plea-bargaining process3 and
often themselves contain subtle ambiguities.4 Moreover,
given both the unusually diverse nature of environmental
harms and the need for simplified guidelines with only a
limited number of SOCs for jury consideration, it is far
from clear what set of “objective” SOCs would provide a
satisfactory means of distinguishing more from less serious environmental crimes. Guidelines that fail to make
important distinctions among cases achieve, at best, only a
false uniformity.
Finally, it is important to recognize that environmental
cases are relatively few in number, averaging little more
than one per district per year.5 In comparison with other
sorts of cases that crowd the federal docket, such as drug,
gun, and immigration cases, uniformity is a rather less
compelling value in the environmental context. When
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similarly situated environmental offenders are sentenced
differently, the disparity will be less clear to the public and
to the offenders themselves; indeed, given the relatively
small number of environmental offenders, there are not
likely many sets of such offenders who are similarly situated in any obvious way.6 Rather than undertaking a
quixotic pursuit of strict uniformity in this context, it is
preferable to implement a set of guidelines that invite
principled discussion and deliberations about the true
moral significance of the offender’s misconduct—this is
the better path to assuring offenders and the public that
sentences are not arbitrary.7
II. Specific Offense Characteristics
A. Nature and Degree of Risk

The SOCs combine considerations of harm, danger, and
mens rea. The threshold requirement for any enhancement (other than the enhancement for death) is that the
offense conduct created an unreasonable risk. This
requirement is intended to correspond to the culpability
level of “criminal negligence” in the Model Penal Code.
For purposes of the SOCs, it is neither necessary nor sufficient that some environmental harm has actually come to
pass; rather, risk is the touchstone of the analysis. This is
consistent with the basic risk-management thrust of modern environmental law.
Not all risk qualifies for an enhancement, however; the
risk must be “unreasonable.” Reasonability is, in part, a
function of the likelihood that the risked harm will actually come to pass, but there is no magic percentage
threshold (e.g., more likely than not). The nature and
degree of the harm, as well as the attendant circumstances, may bear upon the reasonability determination.
B. Severity of Harm

Once it is determined that the offender has created an
unreasonable risk, the next step is to determine the severity of the harm that was risked, which may result in an
enhancement of between one and five levels. The three
most severe categories of harm, however, will only rarely
be implicated, meaning that the jury will really just have
two decision points in most cases: whether there was a
risk of “environmental harm” and, if so, whether that
harm was an “aggravated” one.
The “any environmental harm” SOC is not intended to
set a high bar. It should be routinely satisfied in cases that
arise from a nontrivial discharge of regulated substances.
Thus, for instance, a chemical spill that measurably contaminates even one cubic yard of soil would qualify,
assuming the contamination is not ephemeral in nature.
An environmental harm may rise to the “aggravated”
level based on any of a number of different considerations.
For instance, if the environmental harm SOC is satisfied
on the basis of degradation of air, water, or soil quality, the
harm might be appropriately determined “aggravated”
based on the severity of the degradation and the quantity

of air, water, or soil affected. These considerations ought
to be assessed in light of the prior ecological and social
value of the affected area. Thus, contamination of one acre
of a small but popular urban park might count as aggravated, while contamination of ten acres of land that is
barren and isolated might not. If, by way of further example, the environmental harm SOC is satisfied on the basis
of injury to plant or animal life, the harm might be appropriately determined “aggravated” based on the number of
plants and animals affected. Once again, there is no universal numerical cutoff; rather, the number must be
assessed in light of the ecological and social value of the
affected plants and animals.8 Because these sorts of standards are necessarily imprecise, it may be helpful for the
jury to consider as a benchmark other, somewhat more
objective prongs of the definition of “aggravated environmental harm,” such as the evacuation of a neighborhood
or the imposition of nonserious bodily injuries on at least
five people.
Each of the categories of environmental harm encompasses a wide range of severity. If the severity of the harm
in a given case is at the low end within the category, then
that fact ought to be considered as mitigating by the judge
when selecting a sentence within the applicable range.
Likewise, if the severity of harm is at the high end, then
that fact ought to be considered as aggravating.
Few environmental cases involve an imminent risk of
death or serious bodily injury to a human being. In such
cases, however, the nature of the harm merits a categorically more severe sentence. While some might question
the per se elevation of human over environmental harm,
this approach is consistent with the relevant statutory
schemes.9 For purposes of making distinctions within this
aggravated category, a quantitative approach is employed:
different offense levels apply depending on the number of
people affected.10 The difficulty lies in drawing the specific
cutoff points. There is admittedly some arbitrariness in a
guideline that treats risks imposed on four people as categorically different than risks imposed on five, but does not
make a similar per se distinction as between risks
imposed on five and six. It is expected, however, that the
“cliffs” will be smoothed by the selection of sentences
within the applicable range. For instance, cases involving
a risk of death to four people should generally be sentenced near the top of the range, while cases involving a
risk of death to five should generally be sentenced near the
bottom of the higher range. The proposed sentencing
ranges are wide enough to permit appropriate distinctions
within categories,11 taking into consideration the basic
principle that risks imposed on incremental individuals
from a single act or course of conduct should generally
result in decreasing marginal sentence enhancements.12
“Imminence” is, of course, an imprecise term, but one
as to which there is a rich history of jury interpretation
and implementation.13 It is, moreover, a concept embedded in the existing environmental guidelines.14 At the
same time, the notion of imminent harm is arguably a
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poor fit with environmental crimes, which more typically
impose long-term risks of harm. Here, long-term risks to
human health are captured under the umbrella of “environmental harm,” while imminent risks of death or
serious bodily injury to five or more people are treated as
categorically more serious. This is consistent with the
basic principle of discounting: injuries suffered today are
viewed as more serious than injuries suffered next year.15
Of course, the fact that a threatened, but not quite imminent, injury is almost certain to occur eventually may be
considered an aggravating circumstance for purposes of
selecting a sentence within the range.
C. Aggravated Dangerousness and Mens Rea

If the offense level is enhanced under Subsection (b)(1)
based on an unreasonable risk of harm, then the offense
level might be further enhanced under (b)(2) based on an
elevated risk level (dangerousness) and an aggravated mens
rea. If the offender knew not only that the offense conduct
created a risk of harm but also that the harm was practically
certain to occur, then the offense level should be increased
by 1. The culpability standard corresponds with the “knowledge” standard of the Model Penal Code. If the offender
was merely reckless, an intermediate level of culpability in
the Model Penal Code scheme between negligence and
knowledge, then that fact might be considered an aggravating factor in selecting a sentence within the range.
Likewise, if the offender acted with the purpose of causing
harm, then that fact might also be considered aggravating.
D. Other Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

The remaining aggravating factors in Subsection (c)(1)
relate to (1) the extent of harm that actually came to pass as
a result of the offense conduct; (2) the willfulness of the
underlying environmental violation, in the sense that the
requirements of the law should have been clear to the
offender and/or the importance of environmental compliance had been impressed on the offender in prior judicial
or administrative proceedings; and (3) concealment of the
violation (assuming there is no separate enhancement for
obstruction of justice). At first blush, it might seem odd
that the guideline treats risk of harm as a primary consideration that may go to the jury, while giving actual harm a
secondary role as a factor to be used in selecting a sentence within the range. This reflects the realities of the
environmental context, however, in which the harmful
consequences of a violation may unfold with sufficient
slowness that they are impossible to assess fully at the
time of sentencing, or are prevented from occurring as a
result of timely intervention by the authorities or other fortuities. Either way, a primary focus on actual harm may
result in sentences that do not adequately reflect the dangerousness of the offense conduct.16
The mitigating factors in Subsection (c)(2) recognize
that, while environmental crimes are often strict liability
crimes, it is appropriate to distinguish for sentencing purposes (even if not for guilt–innocence purposes) between
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offenders who have acted in good faith and offenders who
have not. Environmental laws are notoriously complicated,
and, in at least some cases, offenders may be able to make a
persuasive showing that they genuinely believed they were
acting in a lawful manner and that their culpability was thus
relatively low. (Of course, such a showing will be considerably easier in no- and low-danger than in high-danger
cases.) Likewise, if an offender takes steps after a violation
to minimize the risk of harm, particularly to the extent that
such steps exceed what the law requires, such action also
reflects good faith and suggests that the violation may have
been inadvertent. Furthermore, treating such conduct as
mitigating provides offenders with an incentive to undertake socially desirable risk-minimizing responses.
III. Severity

The severity level of the guideline is generally consistent
with the severity level of the existing guidelines. Some representative comparisons are indicated in Table 1. For
instance, under the existing law (specifically, §
2Q1.2(b)(6)), a simple record-keeping violation would produce an offense level of 6 and a term of zero to six
months. (All of the examples here assume Criminal History Category I.) Because a simple record-keeping
violation would probably never involve an unreasonable
risk of harm, the offense would produce an offense level
of 1 and, again, a term of zero to six months under the proposed guideline.

Table 1. Comparison of Severity of Existing and
Proposed Guidelines
Record-keeping
violation
Toxic discharge:
likelihood of death
Knowledge of
imminent death
Repeated,
nontoxic discharge

Existing Guidelines

Proposed Guideline

0–6 mos.

0–6 mos.

37–46 mos.

24–60 mos.

51–63 mos.

60–96 mos.

21–27 mos.

12–24 mos.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, a toxic discharge
resulting in a substantial likelihood of death would produce an offense level of 21 and a term of thirty-seven to
forty-six months under the applicable existing guideline
(2Q1.2(b)(1)(B), (2)). These facts would likely satisfy the
requirements of the unreasonable risk of imminent death
or serious bodily injury SOC (Subsection (b)(1)(C)) under
the proposed guideline, which would produce an offense
level of at least 4 and a term of two to five years (or twentyfour to sixty months).
Under the existing guidelines, an offense committed
with knowledge that the violation placed another person in
imminent danger of death would produce an offense level
of 24 and a term of fifty-one to sixty-three months (2Q1.1).
Under the proposed guideline, an offense committed with
knowledge that imminent death was practically certain (a
slightly higher mens rea) would produce an offense level
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of 5 and a term of five to eight years (or sixty to ninety-six
months).
Under the existing guideline, a more routine sort of
discharge violation, say, a repeated discharge of a nontoxic
pollutant in violation of a permit, would produce an
offense level of 16 and a term of twenty-one to twentyseven months (2Q1.3(b)(1), (4)). Assuming that these facts
would typically be associated with a practical certainty of
some harm to the environment, then the proposed guideline would produce an offense level of 3 and a term of
twelve to twenty-four months. If the harm were practically
certain to be aggravated, as might be the case without triggering any further enhancements under the existing
guideline, then the proposed guideline would produce an
enhanced range of twenty-four to sixty months.
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For a more detailed description and defense of this basic
approach, see Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar
Offender: Punishment, Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133 (2004).
See, e.g., id. at 226 (observing that a “one-time non-toxic discharge in violation of a permit that results in the need for
substantial cleanup expenditures, but does not create any
real likelihood of physical injury” may result in a higher
offense level than an environmental violation resulting in a
substantial likelihood of death).
Michael M. O’Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 Fed. Sent’ing
Rptr. 249, 253 (2005).
See, e.g., O’Hear, supra note 1, at 231-35 (discussing SOCs in
existing environmental guidelines that have generated appellate litigation).
Id. at 205.
Congress adopted uniformity as a dominant goal of the federal system because of concerns that public and offender
perceptions of disparity were casting the system into disrepute and undermining deterrence objectives. Michael M.
O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal
Sentencing, U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 773, 791-93 (2006). It follows that invisible disparities, i.e., disparities that are not
perceived by the public or offenders, should not be viewed
as objectionable to quite the same degree as patent disparities.
Disparities, moreover, may be diminished over time as appellate courts develop a body of case law elaborating on the
basic principles articulated in the guidelines. Appellate decisions may contribute to the development of more specific
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jury instructions, as well as guidance that district court
judges may use to identify jury sentencing decisions that are
not adequately supported by the evidence.
These considerations may require jury deliberation on ecological questions. This may complicate the sentencing process
but should not present any intrinsically greater difficulty than
jury decision making on other questions that often involve
expert testimony, such as loss calculations in securities fraud
and tax cases.
See O’Hear, supra note 1, at 143 (noting that environmental
statutes typically provide maximum sentences of only three
to five years for knowing violations, but up to fifteen years for
violations that place individuals in imminent danger of death
or serious bodily injury).
This contrasts with the qualitative approach taken to ranking
environmental harms. As indicated above, a qualitative
approach is appropriate for environmental harms because
such harms are unusually rich in their variety and complexity.
Thus, for instance, it would be a mistake to treat the contamination of one acre of land as categorically more serious than
the contamination of five; we readily recognize that different
parcels of land may have dramatically different ecological and
economic value for reasons unrelated to their relative size.
(Think, for instance, of the relative seriousness of contaminating one acre of Central Park versus five acres of unused
farmland.) On the other hand, we are generally quite reluctant
to assert that any one human life has more value than any
other. It makes more sense, then, to employ quantitative distinctions with respect to the most severe human health
harms; we can comfortably say that risking the death of five
people is per se more serious than risking the death of one.
An offense involving an unreasonable risk of imminent death or
serious bodily injury to multiple individuals will result in an
offense level of at least 4, which would translate into a range of
at least two to five years. This would permit, for instance, the
sentence for an offender who imposed an unreasonable risk of
death on three or four people to be more than double the sentence for an offender who imposed such a risk on only one.
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 2526 (1988).
See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (discussing imminence requirement for defense of
self-protection).
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.1, comment. (backg’d.) (2004).
For a salient discussion of discounting, see Richard L.
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 95055 (1999).
O’Hear, supra note 1, at 258-59.
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